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Clientelism and Economic Policy is an application of public choice to explain the contemporary 
political economy of Greece, as well as a broader theoretical contribution to the study of 
clientelism as a political and economic phenomenon. Trantidis distinguishes clientelism from the 
typical notion of interest-group politics by describing patron-client relationships as long-term and 
embedded in a party system. Clientelism offers selective benefits to party supporters on a regular 
basis. Trantidis’s description of political parties as structures for rent distribution channeled 
through publicly-owned enterprises resonates with Wagner’s (2016) theory of entangled political 
economy. Rent distribution serves as a key strategy for political parties to safeguard their cohesion 
and capacity for mobilization during and between elections. This system bundles together rent-
seeking activities, skews electoral competition, and ultimately strangles the productive economy. 
Trantidis presents clientelism as the side effect of a substantially state-regulated economy. 
Within this setting, it is rational for politicians and their supporters to allocate rents in ways that 
generate club goods and private benefits. When Greece transitioned to democracy while still 
recovering from a bitter civil war, both the right-wing New Democracy party and the left-wing 
PASOK established large structures of clientelism in order to build mass party bases. In doing so, 
the two major parties developed enduring ties with public sector unions, using public appointments 
and promotions as the reward for political support and loyalty. The result was a scheme of co-
dependence that meant that neither party could ever reduce benefits to clients without cutting off 
their connection with their support groups. This clientelist equilibrium, as Trantidis describes it, 
largely accounts for Greece’s unreformed public sector and fiscal profligacy. For clients and 
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patrons alike, preserving and developing this distributional system was vital for their own career 
advancement. 
The book explains the persistence of poor institutions that result from the development of 
a clientelist system. Even when facing imminent economic crisis, within-party antagonisms and 
inter-party competition make it extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, for political leaders 
to agree on reform. Trantidis describes the reform policies in Greece in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s, and how these policies left clients’ interests protected, augmenting their status relative to 
outsiders. He also discusses various attempts to depart from this equilibrium and their ultimate 
failure in the face of reactions from those within the political parties. The clientelist system’s 
resilience and adaptability is remarkable. Given this context, Trantidis explains how Greece 
joining the European Union and the Eurozone served as a critical lifeline for an otherwise 
unsustainable political structure. It unleashed new EU-wide funds and temporarily assured 
international lenders of the country’s creditworthiness. Euro membership was merely the last 
successful attempt at delaying the inevitable crisis. 
Trantidis’ contribution challenges accounts that are too quick to turn Greece’s story into a 
crude morality play between creditors and debtors or a culture-specific crisis. Although sensitive 
to the tragedy, he locates the cause in a rational ‘clientelist game’ that traps both citizens and 
politicians in a destructive, unsustainable competition for rents, a pattern which can be observed 
in other countries too. 
The result is a book that enriches both our understanding of Greece’s present economic 
malaise and public choice as an open-ended research program capable of interpreting a variety of 
qualitative empirical data. This includes developing theory based textual analysis of archival 
material, press reports, and commentary. The book’s theoretical contribution has the inevitable 
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weakness of covering a single-case study. But this research design has advantages too. By delving 
into one country’s experience Trantidis discerns how incentive problems and limited information 
work together as both objective and subjective barriers to reform-minded social cooperation. In 
Clientelism and Economic Policy, Trantidis explains not just a prominent case of crisis in the 
Eurozone periphery, but also helps advance both methodologically and substantively what Vincent 
Ostrom (1993, p. 164) describes as the periphery of public choice itself. 
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